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I. INTRODUCTION
"[I]f the law put.., everyone in prison, we could be sure to get the drug
dealers."'
HE flow of drugs into America is one of the country's most grave
problems; it lies at the heart of much of our poverty and crime.2
After the latest "war on drugs" was declared in 1989, civil forfei-
ture laws have been more actively enforced as one of the government's
most potent weapons in its arsenal against drug trafficking. 3 The need to
remedy a grave problem, however, should not lead to the adoption of any
method which produces favorable statistics. War cries such as "zero tol-
erance" and "drug free society" may win votes, but they exemplify a law
enforcement approach which tramples the rights of the bystander in the
war on drugs.4 In the pursuit of shutting down the drug trafficking trade,
1. 137 CONG. REC. E 3059-30 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (Statement of Rep. Jacobs).
2. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1970, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566, 4566-68 (blaming much of America's poverty and crime problems on foreign drug
trade industries). In 1989, 55% of all federal criminal appeals involved narcotics offenses.
Charles Edward Anderson, Uncle Sam Gets Serious: A Report From The Front Line, 76
A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (Feb. 1990) (the number of drug-related criminal cases rose 270% during
the 1980s). Since the early 1980s, the number of heroin users in America has increased by
150% and the number of cocaine users by 10,000%. Ostrowski, Thinking About Drug
Legalization, 121 POL'Y ANALYSIS 29-33 (1989). In 1988, 54% of high school students
admitted to the use of illegal drugs. Richard L. Berke, Student Survey Detects Decline in
Use of Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1989, at A16. In 1989, a Gallup Poll reported that more
than 65% of Americans considered illegal drugs to be the nation's biggest problem. Marc
B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 CRIM. L & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 274 (1992).
3. Every administration since that of John F. Kennedy has publicly declared some
type of "war" on drugs. Howard Kohn, Cowboy in the Capital: Drug Czar Bill Bennett,
ROLLING STONE, Nov. 2, 1989, at 42. Expenditures for the most recent war on drugs trip-
led between the years 1980 and 1988, the bill rising above $20 billion at the close of the
1980s. The number of drug related arrests tripled and the number of drug related convic-
tions doubled during the decade. At the same time, America's prison population more
than doubled and an unprecedented percentage of inmates were incarcerated for non-vio-
lent drug-related crimes. Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America?, 3 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 242, 242 (1991). Seizures of cocaine rose from 2,000 kilograms in 1981 to
57,000 kilograms in 1988. Richard Esposito and Bob Drory, Columbia's Traffic in Drugs
Unabated, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 1989, at 7. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the legislative intent behind the enactment of civil forfeiture laws.
4. Despite years of punishment and prohibition, drugs are more readily available
than ever: In President Clinton's former home of Little Rock, Arkansas, crack cocaine is
conveniently sold in $5 and $10 sizes; LSD blotter-sheets bearing the likeness of Hillary
[Vol. 48
1995] CIVIL FORFEITURE
modern drug laws all but ignore the judicial underpinning of criminal law,
that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act5 has enabled the U.S.
government to compel the forfeiture of property used in violation of nar-
cotics laws since its inception in 1970.6 This broadly-defined ability has
led to unfair results and abusive behavior by law enforcement officials.7
In United States v. One 1976 Porsche,8 law enforcement officials seized
the claimant's sports car after finding only .226 of a gram of marijuana in
the trunk. The government brought forfeiture proceedings against the
vehicle9 and the court held that the forfeiture of such highly valued prop-
erty was not unconscionable, even considering the small quantity of con-
traband discovered.10 This holding, although correct within the literal
meaning of section 881, has facilitated the imposition of greatly dispro-
portionate and unfair consequences to property owners."
In United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz12 law enforcement officials
conducted an illegal search of a luxury car which produced a package
containing cocaine. The driver of the vehicle was not the owner, but had
borrowed the car from the owner who had no knowledge of the illegal
contraband possessed by the driver. The criminal case against the driver
Clinton sell for $1 per dose; and brown-tar heroin has made its presence felt as far down as
local elementary schools. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Drug-User (December 23,
1993).
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 [hereinafter Drug Act]. The civil forfeiture provisions of the
Act are codified at 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Criminal forfeiture of property is authorized by
21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
6. Drug Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (also known as the
Controlled Substances Act). The forfeiture of property has long been recognized as an
effective tool in law enforcement and is authorized under many circumstances that repre-
sent violations of various federal laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) (authorizing the
forfeiture of property acquired in violation of anti-trust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 1177 (1988)
(authorizing the forfeiture of property used in illegal gambling); 16 U.S.C. §§ 65, 117(d),
128, 171, 256C (1988) (authorizing the forfeiture of guns and other equipment used unlaw-
fully in national parks and private hunting grounds); 18 U.S.C. § 3668(d) (1988) (authoriz-
ing the forfeiture of vehicles and aircraft seized for a violation of liquor laws).
7. See infra Parts II and III for an overview of the unfair results created by the inter-
pretation of the statute; Part IV for an examination of the abusive administration of the
forfeiture power.
8. 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979).
9. Civil forfeiture proceedings are in rem and considered to be against the property in
question. United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
10. One 1976 Porsche, 670 F.2d at 812. The court stated that the language of the stat-
ute is such that quantity or intended use is not a consideration when determining the valid-
ity of a forfeiture. Id. at 812. This interpretation of the Drug Act has been criticized as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The U.S. Constitution requires proportional results
when it takes in personam action, but not necessarily with actions which are designated as
in rem. Petitioners' Amicus Curiae Brief at 2, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801
(1993), (No. 92-6073).
11. See infra notes 40-42, 121-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unfair
consequences created by the proportionality problem.
12. 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984).
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was dropped for lack of evidence. 13 The forfeiture proceedings involving
the innocent owner, however, were successful because she was said to
have no standing to challenge the illegal search. 14 The innocence of the
owner was not enough to overcome the forfeiture of the property.
Such cases raise serious questions about the constitutionality and fair-
ness of the forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]ndividual freedom finds tangible expression in property
rights. At stake in ... forfeiture cases are the security and privacy of the
home and those who take shelter within it.' 15 Recognizing the need for
reform, the Supreme Court recently addressed several of these issues and
significantly curtailed the potency of the government's forfeiture power.' 6
The interpretation and administration of the Drug Act create a process
with the potential for great abuse which does not afford the rights of
property owners adequate judicial protection. The procedural aspects of
forfeiture under section 881 all but guarantee government success 17 and
do not follow the fundamental notions of fair play and justice typically
found in the American judicial system.
This comment will discuss these concerns by examining the present in-
terpretation and administration of the Drug Act. Part II of this comment
outlines the general provisions of the Drug Act and its judicial interpreta-
tion as a civil in rem proceeding. It also provides an overview of the
practical effects of such a designation and analyzes how the rights of
property owners are not adequately protected. Part III more closely ex-
amines three of these problems and the recent remedial steps taken by
the Supreme Court to limit the scope of the government's forfeiture
power. Part IV considers the potential for abuse and corruption created
by the administration of the Drug Act by law enforcement officials. Fi-
nally, Part V of this comment predicts future steps to limit theprovisions
of the Drug Act and concludes that the scope of the government's forfei-
ture power must be curtailed in such a manner as to alleviate these
problems while allowing the Drug Act to continue as an effective tool in
the war on drugs.
13. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the exclusionary rule was appli-
cable to the case against the driver and the evidence was barred as being in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 448.
14. Id. A violation of due process by the government only invokes the exclusionary
rule in favor of those parties whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated. An illegal
search does not automatically prevent the government from judicially compelling the for-
feiture of private property. Id. at 450.
15. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 508 (1993)(recognizing individual property rights as an essential principle of freedom and privacy).
16. These recent decisions are United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, Austin v.
United States, and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property. See infra Part III for
a discussion of these cases.
17. Anton R. Valukas, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You Can't Take It With You,
14 LITIG. 31, 34 (1988) (this advantage explains why the government is "not inclined to
settle forfeiture cases"). The government wins a vast majority of civil forfeiture cases with-
out a judicial contest from the owner and the government's losing of a civil forfeiture case




II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 21 U.S.C. § 881
A. THE GENERAL FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF 21 U.S.C. § 881
Section 881 of the Drug Act provides that the owner of property shall
have no property right in any things of value which are furnished or are
intended to be furnished by any person, not necessarily by the true
owner, in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the Drug
Act,18 in anything used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation
of the Drug Act, or in any proceeds traceable to such activity. 19 The
properties subject to such forfeiture include vehicles,20 personal prop-
erty2' and real property.22
The theory behind empowering the government to compel the forfei-
ture of such a broad spectrum of property is simple. The government
viewed a high profit margin as the motive behind drug trafficking and
sought to eliminate this motive through the use of forfeiture, independent
of any criminal charges, of the illegally derived assets.23 It is clear that
the legislative intent in drafting section 881 was specifically to attack and
eliminate the benefits of drug trafficking.24 The language of the Drug
Act is broad enough, however, for the courts to ignore the intended use
of any illegal contraband and bypass the original legislative intent by
compelling the forfeiture of property owned by non-traffickers. 25
18. A violation of any provision of 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 will trigger this language. 21
U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
19. 21 U.S.C § 881(a). Section 881(a)(6) provides, in part:
[tihe following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them.., things of value furnished or intended to
be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in viola-
tion of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys ... used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter ....
Id. (emphasis added).
-20. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).
21. Id. § 881(a)(6).
22. Id. § 881(a)(7).
23. H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N 3182, 3374. The Drug Act allows the government to remove the profits of
drug trafficking and thus remove the incentive. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
24. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567; see United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1205
(1974) (discussing the legislative history of section 881).
25. United States v. $31,990 in U.S. Currency, 982 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that the original intent behind section 881 was to stop narcotics trafficking, not neces-
sarily small-scale personal use of narcotics without intent to sell); United States v. One
1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that any "measurable quan-
tity" of contraband is enough to support a forfeiture, even if it was evident that the contra-
band was intended for personal use). Furthermore, the Executive Branch of the
government has "lost sight of the legislative purpose of the forfeiture provisions and has
begun to see them as a source of much-needed revenues." Jed S. Rakoff, Will the Supreme
Court Restrain Forfeiture?, N.Y.L.J., July 8, 1993, at 4. Forfeited items valued at more than
$50,000 comprise only 17% of the 1991 inventory, a statistic which contradicts the official
policy that the "little guy" is not the intended target of section 881. 137 CONG. REC.
E3059-03, E3060 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs)
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Subject property may be seized by law enforcement officials without a
warrant if probable cause exists to believe that the property has been
used in violation of the Drug Act.2 6 Once the property is seized, in order
to affect a successful forfeiture, the government need only demonstrate
probable cause for the belief that a nexus existed between the property
and the behavior proscribed by the Drug Act.27 Thus, a criminal convic-
tion of the owner is not required and the acquittal of the owner of any
related criminal charges is not a defense to the forfeiture.2 8 Once the
government has met this burden, the burden shifts to the property
owner 29 to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is no
nexus between the property and the alleged illicit behavior. 30
Once forfeited, the property is at the disposal of the Attorney Gen-
eral.31 The only restriction on its use is that the property be retained for
"official" purposes or be transferred to any Federal or State agency which
directly participated in the seizure or forfeiture.32 The property may also
be sold by any "commercially feasible means. '33 These vague restrictions
create a potential for abuse on the part of the officials charged with the
discretionary maintenance and administration of forfeited property.34
Because the focus of forfeiture proceedings under section 881 is on the
property itself and not the liberty of the owner, these proceedings are
considered to be in rem, or against the property, without regard to the
actions or identity of the owner.35 This technical distinction has led to the
26. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(3). Section 881(b) provides, in part: "seizure without such pro-
cess may be made when ... the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property is subject to civil forfeiture under this subchapter." Id.
27. United States v. $364,960 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983). See infra notes
61-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of what is required for a successful showing
of probable cause.
28. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984);
United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987); see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
29. Section 881(d) incorporates 19 U.S.C. § 1615 by reference, which details the shift-
ing of the burden of proof from the government to the claimant once the proper nexus
between the property and the alleged behavior has been established. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d)
(1988).
30. United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 231 F. Supp 27, 29 (E.D. Wis. 1964)
(holding that the claimant's burden in a civil forfeiture proceeding is met by a preponder-
ance of the evidence). The property owner may also attempt to show that the "innocent
owner" provision of the Drug Act applies and, thus, that the forfeiture is not proper. 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). There is also an exception for common carriers codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4)(A).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1).
32. 21 U.S.C. 881 (e)(1)(A). Section 881 (e)(1) provides, in part: "Whenever property
is civilly . . .forfeited under this subchapter the Attorney General may ...retain the
property for official use or... transfer the property to any Federal agency or to any State or
local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the
property." Id. (emphasis added).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(B) (1988).
34. See infra Part IV for a discussion of administrative abuses of forfeited property
held by government entities.
35. United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp 32, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 509 (1921) (holding that the vehicle
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designation of forfeiture proceedings under section 881 as civil in nature,
even though they are connected to the alleged commission of a criminal
act.
3 6
B. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DESIGNATING PROCEEDINGS UNDER 21
U.S.C. § 881 AS CIVIL IN NATURE
1. Usual Constitutional Safeguards Are Not Always Triggered
The designation of forfeiture under section 881 as civil in nature means
that the owner need not be charged with or convicted of any crime to
forfeit ownership of the property.37 In one study, eighty percent of suc-
cessful civil forfeitures conducted by the U.S. government did not have
any corresponding criminal charges. 38 Because the liberty of a defendant
is not at stake, civil forfeiture proceedings do not trigger the full spectrum
of constitutional safeguards.3 9
Disproportionate consequences are a common result with civil forfei-
ture proceedings. The quantity of any illegal contraband found in a
search is irrelevant and the seriousness of the alleged offense is not a
factor in determining the judicially imposed consequences. 40 This leads
itself was guilty of wrongdoing); Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 397
(1877) (considering an inanimate object to be capable of wrongdoing and thus, the judicial
proceeding is considered to be against the object and not its owner). The oldest roots of
civil forfeiture are found in Exodus: "If an ox gore a man that he [shall] die, the ox shall be
stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten." Exodus 21:28; see United States v. One 1963
Cadillac Coupe de Ville TWo-Door, 250 F. Supp. 183, 185 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (the court
stated that "[w]hen this ancient concept [of Exodus] is recalled, our understanding of the
law of forfeiture of chattels is more easily understood"; the court also discussed the long
tradition of in rem forfeiture in the American justice system). See generally Lewis J. Heis-
man, J.D., Annotation, Forfeiture of Personal Property Used in Illegal Manufacture,
Processing or Sale of Controlled Substances Under § 511 of Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C.S. § 881) 59 A.L.R. FED. 765 (1982) (examin-
ing the legal theories supporting the in rem distinction).
36. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974)
(the Court discussed the English and American histories of civil forfeiture and examined
the justifications for them); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886) (holding
forfeiture to be a civil proceeding); see United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387-
89 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (discussing the history and origins of civil forfeiture); Jacob L. Fin-
kelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful
Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973). See generally
Irving A. Pianin, Comment, Criminal Forfeiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of
Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 227, 229 (1982) (distinguishing in rem
forfeiture proceedings from in personam, or criminal forfeiture, which focuses on the guilt
or innocence of a person).
37. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984);
United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987).
38. 137 CONG. REC. E3059 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs) (this
was a ten-month study conducted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania).
39. United States v. Riverbend Farms, Inc., 847 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1988); United
States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe, 115 F. Supp. 723, 728 (D.N.J. 1953).
40. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, Austin
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (stating that "the government [was] exacting too
high of a penalty in relation to the offense," but nonetheless upholding the validity of the
forfeiture); United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding that any "measurable amount" of contraband is enough to support a forfeiture,
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to the possibility that a civil forfeiture could impose more severe conse-
quences on a property owner than a corresponding criminal penalty
would impose.41 Such a result appears to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban on excessive fines. 42
The success of civil forfeiture proceedings is not always affected by
Fourth Amendment due process violations. 43 In United States v. One
1977 Mercedes Benz, 44 the forfeiture of the claimant's luxury car was suc-
cessful notwithstanding a due process violation during the search of the
vehicle.45 In cases where the property owner does have standing to claim
a due process violation, such a violation still will not strip the government
of its ability to compel the forfeiture.46
The claimant in a civil forfeiture proceeding is afforded partial constitu-
tional protection under the Fifth Amendment.47 The claimant cannot be
compelled to answer questions and can remain silent by invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination. 48 If this protection is invoked, how-
ever, the claimant will not be able to carry the proper burden of proof
and will lose the case. An owner who refuses to testify based on grounds
of self-incrimination lacks standing to contest the forfeiture. 49 There is,
however, no Fifth Amendment protection against placing the claimant in
double jeopardy because any possible result of a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing is considered to affect only the property and not the claimant's lib-
erty.50 This places the claimant in a precarious situation: either testify to
the source and use of the contraband - possibly invoking criminal liabil-
irrespective of the value of the forfeited property); United States v. One Clipper Bow
Ketch (Nisku), 548 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1977).
41. See, e.g., United States v. One 1980 Red Ferrari, 875 F.2d 186, 189 (8th Cir. 1989)(vehicle owner who was found guilty of narcotics possession and subject to a criminal fine
of $1,000 subsequently forfeited his vehicle with a value of more than 40 times the criminal
fine under a civil forfeiture action brought by the federal government); United States v.
835 Seventh St., 820 F. Supp. 688 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (six ounces of marijuana, worth $1,125,
were found in the claimant's house, worth $69,000, which was subsequently forfeited to the
government).
42. The Eighth Amendment provides, in part: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.,
amend. VIII (emphasis added). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977) (not-
ing that Eighth Amendment protections are not applicable to a claimant in a civil.forfei-
ture case). See infra Part III.B for further discussion of the proportionality in rem problem.
43. United States v. $73,277 in United States Currency, 710 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1983)
(discussing the application of the Fourth Amendment to civil forfeiture proceedings).
44. 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
45. Id.; see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text for the relevant facts and proce-
dural history.
46. United States v. $297,235, 516 F.' Supp. 720, 722 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (upholding a
forfeiture when the introduction of evidence wholly unrelated to the due process violation
against the claimant is independently sufficient to support probable cause to make the
seizure).
47. Baker v. United States, 722 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment is applicable to civil forfeiture proceedings).
48. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) (stating that
the privilege against self-incrimination applies to civil forfeitures under the Drug Act
where in other civil actions it may not apply).
49. Baker, 722 F.2d at 519.
50. See United States v. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1972).
1995] CIVIL FORFEITURE
ity for its presence - or claim protection under the Fifth Amendment,
causing a failure to carry the requisite burden of proof.
This lack of constitutional safeguards is based solely upon the legal fic-
tion that forfeiture under section 811 is an in rem civil proceeding. These
usual constitutional safeguards ensure that justice and fairness are pres-
ent in the American judicial process. Without a more reasonable justifi-
cation of their absence, civil forfeiture under section 881 is unjust and
unfair.5 1
2. The Burden of Proof in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
The government's typical burden of proof in criminal proceedings, in-
cluding criminal forfeiture, is to prove every element of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.52 The defendant must establish any defenses to a crim-
inal charge by a preponderance of the evidence.5 3 When the government
attempts to impose civil penalties, the government must show the defend-
ant's liability by a preponderance of the evidence. 54
In a civil forfeiture proceeding under section 881, however, the govern-
ment's burden of proof is lowered to a showing of probable cause.55 This
burden has been articulated as "less than prima facie proof but more than
mere suspicion," 56 and has been characterized as the "lowest [burden] in
any American courtroom. '' 57 The determination that forfeiture proceed-
ings under section 881 are civil in nature allows courts to reject the bur-
den of proof required by the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution
and impose in its place the burden of probable cause.5 8 Once probable
cause has been shown by the government, the burden shifts to the claim-
51. The Bill of Rights is central to the notion of restricting government interference in
the private affairs of its citizens and is crucial in safeguarding the liberty and security of
citizens with regard to property. See generally, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
(discussing the fundamental need to protect certain private interests from government
intrusion).
52. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
701-02 (1975).
53. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206; Mulaney, 421 U.S. at 697.
54. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48 (1914) (detailing the burden of proof in a
civil penalty case brought by the United States government).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 881 expressly incorporates 19 U.S.C. § 1615 which provides, in part:
"the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant ... [pjrovided, [t]hat probable cause shall
first be shown for the institution of such suit or action .... 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982)
(emphasis added); see United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1425 (11th
Cir. 1983); United States v. $364,960 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1989).
57. Preview of U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 1992-93 Term, Issue No. 1, Sept. 30, 1992, at
1; see United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussing what level of proof is required to make a showing of probable cause in relation
to other burdens of proof); United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702
F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1983) (detailing what is required for a showing of probable
cause).
58. United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982);
Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974).
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ant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not
used in connection with any activity proscribed by the Drug Act.5 9
Thus, the government has lowered its own burden of proof while main-
taining the higher burden of proof the owner would be required to meet
in any other criminal or civil penalty proceeding against him. The respec-
tive burdens of proof on the government and the claimant heavily favor
government success and create a situation where the standard "innocent
until proven guilty" does not apply.60
3. Meeting the Burden of Probable Cause
In meeting its evidentiary burden, the government can make use of
evidence that is not relevant in proceedings which impose a higher stan-
dard of proof. In addition to direct evidence, both hearsay and circum-
stantial evidence are effective tools available to the government in
making its showing of probable cause.61 Furthermore, it is not necessary
for the government to establish each and every element of its claim, as is
required in a criminal case or civil penalty proceeding. 62 Unlike the gov-
ernment, the claimant must strictly adhere to the rules of evidence.63 The
claimant's burden is not provable by hearsay nor by circumstantial evi-
59. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (incorporating 19 U.S.C. § 1615's procedural rules for
shifting the burden of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding). Customs laws are also incor-
porated by reference into § 881. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S.
Ct. 492, 505-06 (1993). The claimant may also attempt to show that he comes under the
innocent owner provision by a preponderance of the evidence. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
60. By shifting the burden of proof upon a showing of probable cause by the govern-
ment, the property is effectively guilty until proven innocent. DAVID SMrrIH, PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE OF CIVIL FORFErrURE CASES 1 11.03 (1990). See United States v. The
Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apartment 1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting the unfairness of the relative burdens of proof, but uphold-
ing the seizure as the court was bound by the express language of the statute).
61. See, e.g., United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. One 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983) (permitting the government to make use of hearsay in a
civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. $2,500.00 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d
10, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Aponte v. United States, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (hold-
ing that circumstantial evidence is available for government use in showing probable
cause); see, e.g., United States v. $103,075 in U.S. Currency, 741 F. Supp. 903, 905 (M.D.
Ga. 1989) (holding that the sheer amount of cash seized by the government was a key
factor in determining probable cause and triggering a shift in the burden; noting in dicta
that a large amount of cash is a "common thread" running through cases involving posses-
sion or distribution of controlled substances and the proceeds therefrom). But see United
States v. $7,850 in U.S. Currency, 7 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1993) (evidence of suspicious be-
havior, traveling under an assumed name, prior drug convictions, and the purchasing of a
ticket with cash was not enough to constitute probable cause and shift the burden to the
claimant); FED. R. EvID. 802 (providing that hearsay is not admissible unless it comes
under a specific exception).
62. United States v. United States Currency Totaling $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120, 1126-
27 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
. 63. United States v. One 1968 Piper Navaho Twin Engine Aircraft, 594 F.2d 1040, 1042
(5th Cir. 1979) (stating that the higher standard of proof placed upon the claimant de-
mands the use of more formal rules of evidence).
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dence unless it falls within a handful of narrow exceptions as provided by
the applicable rules of evidence. 64
The government often relies on "drug courier profiles" to facilitate a
showing of probable cause. 65 If a suspect traveller appears nervous, has
checked no luggage, and has paid cash for a ticket to a "drug source" city
with a quick turn-around time, that traveler matches the government's
"drug courier profile." 66 Simply matching this profile often subjects the
traveller to closer scrutiny by law enforcement officials.67 These profiles
should not constitute evidence of probable cause as they account for
much innocent behavior.68
Race is often a factor in determining probable cause to make an initial
asset seizure, although it is never articulated as such by the seizing en-
tity.69 In Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration,70 the
court stated that it was "clear from the testimony that Drug Interdiction
Unit officers approached [the subjects] because of their race." 71 The
court also noted the troubling nature of the officer's admission that the
sole basis for the detention and subsequent investigation of two Hispanic
men in an unrelated case was the fact that they were traveling in the
company of a Caucasian woman. 72 In 1991, the racial composition of all
travellers who had flown on commercial airlines during the previous year
was greatly disproportionate to the high number of minorities who had
been stopped and questioned.73
64. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803, 804 (providing a laundry list of exceptions to the rule
against hearsay).
65. Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency, 819 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Tenn.
1993).
66. Id. at 718.
67. Id. at 698.
68. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (discussing the use of the drug
courier profile by the government in attempting to show probable cause); Reid v. Georgia,
448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Superstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1227-29 (6th Cir. 1983)
(noting that current drug courier profiles account for much innocent behavior and are not
completely reliable as proof of illicit activity).
69. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 723-24 (examining racial stereotypes as a reason for con-
ducting searches and seizures). The government consistently claims not to have based
probable cause on racial criteria, but law enforcement statistics tell a different story. 137
CONG. REC. E3059 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs). See infra note 73
for relevant racial statistics.
70. Jones, 819 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting that the statutory scheme of
section 881 and the administration of it provide substantial opportunity for abuse and
corruption).
71. Id. at 723.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 713-14. The reported percentages of travelers are as follows: 87.5% Cauca-
sian; 5.1% African-American; 1.6% Hispanic; and .8% Asian. Id., (citing The Gallup Or-
ganization, Air Travel Survey (1991)). The racial percentages of persons stopped by the
Drug Interdiction Unit (hereinafter "DIU") during the stated period was as follows:
13.46% Hispanic and 1.7% Asian. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 713-14 (the racial distinction of
the persons was based upon the origin of their surnames, the names were taken from the
DIU's forfeiture logbook). In one instance, "an examination of 121 travelers' cases in
which police found no illegal drugs, made no arrest, but seized money anyway, showed that
77 percent of the people stopped were black, Hispanic or Asian." 137 CONG. REc. E3059
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs).
SMU LAW REVIEW
Dog sniffs are frequently used to assist the government's showing of
probable cause.74 Controlled studies have, however, shown this proce-
dure to be highly inaccurate. One study shows that a dog sniff would
result in a positive reaction to over 96% of U.S. currency.75 Such high
sensitivity to minute traces of narcotics does not yield any relevant infor-
mation about the prior use of the currency and should not be used as
evidence of probable cause. A positive dog sniff may signal only the pres-
ence of money, not the money's involvement in drug trafficking. 76
By allowing the government to use hearsay and circumstantial evidence
in meeting its burden of proof, the government is effectively required to
prove nothing. Having a low burden of proof and liberal rules of evi-
dence show that the shifting of the burden to the claimant is an illusion.
Under these circumstances, the burden is effectively placed upon the
claimant from the outset of the trial.
4. Restrictions on Delay in Initiation of Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
Following an initial seizure of property, the government is required to
initiate forfeiture proceedings within a "reasonable" amount of time.77
Courts are given considerable discretion, however, in determining what is
"reasonable". In one case, a delay of over fourteen months was upheld as
reasonable. 78 In addition to the reasonability requirement, the com-
mencement of a civil forfeiture action must occur within the five year
limitations period imposed by federal customs law, implying that a period
of up to five years might be considered reasonable. 79 The delay need not
be unintentional to be upheld under a reasonability test. In United States
v. Oil Screw Gulf Princess II,80 the government's delay in initiating civil
forfeiture proceedings was admittedly an intentional delay to gain lever-
74. United States v. $53,082 in U.S. Currency, 985 F.2d 245, 250 n.5 (6th Cir. 1992)
(examining the frequency of dog-sniffs and questioning their validity and relevance to a
showing of probable cause); United States v. $175,260 in U.S. Currency, 741 F. Supp. 45,46
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing the typical dog-sniff procedure).
75. $53,082 in U.S. Currency, 985 F.2d at 250 n.5. DEA chemists reported that cur-
rency in general circulation is contaminated with narcotics from contact with other contam-
inated bills. Id.
76. United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) provides, in part: "[I]n the event of a seizure pursuant to para-
graph (3) or (4) of this subsection, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be
instituted promptly." 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Courts interpret this
provision as requiring reasonable promptness. United States v. One Motor Yacht Named
Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112, 1114 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that a 12 month delay was reasonable
under the circumstances).
78. United States v. One 1973 Ford LTD, 409 F. Supp. 741, 741-42 (D. Nev. 1976).
79. A forfeiture action may not be dismissed for non-compliance with the timing re-
quirements of 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-07 as long as the action was filed within the 5-year
statute of limitations required by customs laws. See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo,
495 U.S. 711, 716-22 (1990); United States v. James Daniel Good real property, 971 F.2d
1376, 1379 (9th cir. 1992), rev'd in part by 114 S. Ct. 492, 505-06 (1993) (noting that federal
customs laws are incorporated into section 881 by reference).
80. 543 F. Supp. 1037 (D.S.C. 1983).
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age in a criminal case against the ship's owners but was still upheld as
reasonable.81
Any chance the owner does have of regaining possession of the seized
property greatly diminishes with the passage of time.82 A lengthy delay
could mean that a civil forfeiture action could go unchallenged because
the prohibitive cost of a delayed trial could outweigh the value of the
seized property.83 Lengthy delays also mean that a property owner must
go without the benefit of the property, adding further economic distress
to the situation. 84 Consequently, this system may reward the seizure of
property without probable cause because of the increased probability that
the forfeiture will go uncontested after a lengthy, but "reasonable" delay.
5. Notice Requirements in Initiation of Civil Forfeiture Proceedings and
The Problem of Summary Forfeiture
An owner of property seized pursuant to section 881 is not constitu-
tionally guaranteed a pre-seizure hearing.85 In light of the absence of a
pre-seizure hearing, the importance of the notice requirements placed
upon the government greatly increases. If there is no pre-seizure hearing
and if lengthy delays occur in instituting forfeiture proceedings, the
owner of the property may have to rely on government notice to learn of
the initial seizure. It is possible that the owner is not aware of the seizure
and would not become aware of it without actual notice from the seizing
entity.86 This is particularly likely when the owner has loaned the prop-
erty to a third party and is unaware of the illicit activity. Thus, the gov-
ernment should be held to strict notice requirements that are in such a
way as to adequately protect both the owner's due process right to a pre-
seizure hearing and the government's interest in making immediate and
unannounced seizures.
81. Id. at 1041. Unless the delay is of an unreasonable length, the intent behind the
delay is irrelevant. Id.
82. See DAVID SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES
10.05 (1990) (discussing the diminishing possibility of winning a forfeiture case after the
government's lengthy delay in initiating the action).
83. Id.
84. See United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 570 (1982)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (the dissenting opinion stated that to dispossess a citizen of the use
and benefit of property for 18 months without a hearing is a violation of the owner's fifth
amendment rights).
85. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 633, 678-79 (utiliz-
ing a balancing test to determine the necessity of a pre-seizure hearing; the court held that
the government's interest in ensuring the security of the property outweighed the owner's
interest in it); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (formulating a balancing test used
in such circumstances); United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1097 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a pre-seizure hearing is not a constitutional pre-requisite for a successful civil forfei-
ture proceeding).
86. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972) (holding that the notice of the seizure
and pending forfeiture proceedings was inadequate where the property owner was known
to be in jail at the time; under the circumstances, the owner was completely reliant upon
receiving actual notice to learn of the seizure).
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The notice requirement imposed on the government is dependent upon
the value of the seized property. If the property value is less than
$10,000, the government can give notice by mere publication. 87 If no
claim for relief is filed within three weeks of publication, plus twenty
days, the property is summarily forfeited to the government. 88 Summary
forfeiture does not impose any further burden upon the government.
There is no trial required, or even a showing of probable cause, to affect a
summary forfeiture. 89 Summary forfeiture is likely to go unchallenged
because the cost to the owner of filing suit and carrying his burden of
proof at trial is likely to outweigh the value of the property in such
cases. 90 This empowers the government to make seizures of relatively
low-valued assets without probable cause and expect a high success rate
under this summary forfeiture rule. 91 If the value of the property exceeds
$10,000, the government must attempt to give actual notice to the owner
and initiate formal judicial forfeiture proceedings. 92 As a result, the pres-
ent structure of the notice system rewards the seizure of property without
probable cause.
Courts typically approve of these notice requirements based on the ra-
tionale of administrative convenience. 93 Under a balancing test to deter-
mine whether a due process violation has occurred,94 however,
administrative convenience to the government should not always out-
weigh the property rights of an individual.95
In cases where the seized property is the owner's only significant asset
or where the total value of the owner's possessions are approximate to a
value of $10,,000, a summary forfeiture is likely to occur. Even if actual
87. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1609 (1982) (these sections are expressly incorporated into the
Drug Act by section 881).
88. Id.
89. Id.; Winters v. Working, 510 F. Supp. 14, 16 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
90. Upon notice, the claimant must post a bond to the government in the sum of
$5,000 or 10% of the property's value, whichever is less, but at a minimum of $250, adding
a further economic burden to the claimant's situation. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982). Claimants
who challenge a government forfeiture "have the choice of fighting the full resources of the
U.S. Treasury or caving in." 137 CONG. REc. E3060 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Jacobs).
91. 80% of civil forfeiture cases go uncontested. 137 CONG. REC. E3060 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs). So called "big-ticket" items, those not subject
to summary forfeiture, comprised only 17% of the forfeiture inventory in a Pittsburgh
Press study ending in December of 1990. Id.
92. 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1982) (this section is expressly incorporated into the Drug Act
by section 881).
93. See, e.g., In Re Warrant to Seize One 1988 Chevrolet Monte Carlo v. United
States, 861 F.2d 307, 310 (1st Cir. 1988); Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1091-93 (7th
Cir. 1986).
94. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (weighing three prongs of a balancing
test: (1) consideration of the private interests effected by the government action, (2) the
risk of erroneous intervention or deprivation, and (3) the government interest at stake -
including but not limited to any increased administrative burden); United States v. One
1971 BMW Four-Door Sedan, 652 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1981).
95. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (noting in dicta that when a
taking of property has drastic economic consequences, denial of the right to actual notice
violates the fundamental principles of due process).
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notice is given, such persons are typically unable to afford to file suit be-
cause the forfeited assets are generally not available for the payment of
court costs and attorney's fees.96 A forfeiture would leave them destitute
and likely to engage in criminal activity. Under these circumstances, sec-
tion 881 would perpetuate the illicit activity it was designed to curb.
6. Protection of Innocent Property Owners
The government's burden of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding re-
quires only a showing of probable cause for the belief that a nexus exists
between the property and the behavior proscribed by the Drug Act.97 In
meeting this burden, the government is not required to bring criminal
charges against the owner, and the acquittal of the owner on any related
criminal charges is not a defense to the forfeiture. 98 Thus, third party
owners or spouses are extremely susceptible to the consequences of be-
havior which is outside of that person's knowledge or sphere of control.99
This should not imply, however, that the "innocence" of the claimant of
any criminal wrongdoing is completely without relevance. If the claimant
can come under an exception provided by section 881, the forfeiture ac-
tion will fail.100
The Drug Act expressly provides a safe harbor for "innocent" owners,
those persons with an interest in the seized property but who had no
knowledge of and were not responsible in any way for the illicit acts
which gave rise to the forfeiture. 10 1 Section 881 (a)(6) provides that "no
property shall be forfeited.., to the extent of an interest of the owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner."'02
This defense, however, becomes ineffectual when the government by-
96. See generally Anton R. Valukas, Forfeitures: When Uncle Sam Says You Can't Take
It With You, 14 LITIG. 31 (1988) (discussing the forfeiture of attorney's fees and the appli-
cation of the sixth amendment).
97. United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1983);
United Sates v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
98. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUsTIcE, DRUG AGENT'S GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS
(1987 revision), 3-9 (1987); see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987).
99. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Webb v. United States, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984) (vehicle of innocent owner
was forfeited); United States v. One 1982 Datsun 200SX, 627 F. Supp. 62, 63 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (a company car was subject to forfeiture because of employee behavior, irrespective
of the behavior of the corporation), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v.
One 1977 Porsche Carrera 911 VIN 9117201924, 748 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Tex. 1990), aft'd,
946 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Carl H. Loewenson Jr., Banks as Innocent Owners in
Forfeiture Cases, N.Y.L.J. Mar. 17, 1993, 1 (discussing lending institutions as third-party
innocent owners and the protection of real property liens).
100. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) ("innocent owner" defense is expressly given as an
exception and is codified at § 881(a)(6)).
101. Id. Historically, innocence was not a defense. The decision in Colero-Toledo led
to Legislative amendments to codify the exception under section 881. Colero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Compare Pub. Law No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970) with 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) (1988).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
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passes the use of a pre-seizure hearing and obtains a seizure warrant in an
ex parte proceeding. To obtain an ex parte seizure warrant, the govern-
ment is required to make its showing of probable cause, but because this
is a unilateral proceeding, the Magistrate can issue a warrant without re-
quiring the government to disprove the possibility of innocent owner-
ship. 10 3 Even if the claimant does prove his defense of innocent
ownership, there is no recourse for the temporary deprivation the inno-
cent owner has erroneously suffered. 1°4 Furthermore, the problem of
summary forfeiture places innocent third party owners and spouses in ad-
ditional jeopardy because they could lose their ability to claim this
defense.
III. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF 21 U.S.C. § 881 AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S POWER
The interpretation and administration of section 881's forfeiture provi-
sions raise many issues of fairness, constitutionality, and corruption. The
most troubling of these issues, however, are the lack of protection for
innocent owners, the potential for disproportionate results, and the ab-
sence of a pre-seizure hearing or notice. The scope of the statutory
power granted to the government should be limited in such a way that
these problems are alleviated without emasculating the forfeiture provi-
sions of section 881.
A. PROTECTION OF THE INNOCENT OWNER
1. Protection Provided by Section 881 and the Problem of Relation-
Back
The innocent owner defense 0 5 conflicts with the apparent timing of
vestiture of the government's interest in seized property.' 6 Section
881(h) provides, in part: "[aill right, title, and interest in property...
shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section."'1 7 The government has consistently
claimed that the commission of the illicit act is the mechanism by which
title immediately vests in the United States.108 If the government's inter-
est does vest automatically upon commission of the act, the claimant
would be effectively barred from utilizing the "innocent owner" defense
103. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 500-02 (1993).
104. Id.
105. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) (1988). See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the innocent owner defense.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993);
United States v. 10652 South Laramie, 779 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. I11. 991); United States v.
3181 S.W. 138th Place, 778 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that the "relation-back"
doctrine destroyed liens created after the commission of the illicit act but prior to the
initiation of forfeiture proceedings).
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when the claimant has acquired title subsequent to the commission of the
act giving rise to the forfeiture. 10 9
2. The Supreme Court's Solution to the Innocent Owner Problem and
Relation Back
In United States v. Buena Vista Ave.,110 the claimant received approxi-
mately $240,000 as a gift from a personal acquaintance to purchase the
house which she and her children had occupied for the previous six years.
The district court held that the government had established probable
cause to believe that the funds used by the claimant to purchase the
house were the illegally derived proceeds of drug trafficking."' The
claimant moved for application of the innocent owner defense, claiming
that she was without knowledge of the illicit activity. The district court
rejected this defense and held that only bona fide purchasers for value or
persons who had acquired their property interest before the commission
of the illicit act could successfully assert the defense as provided in sec-
tion 881(a)(6). 12
The court of appeals declined to limit the innocent owner defense to
bona fide purchasers for value and overruled the district court.1 3 The
court examined the statutory language and legislative history of section
881 and determined that they suggest no such limitation on the definition
of the term "owner.""14 The court held that the term "owner" should be
broadly construed so as to include any person with any interest in the
property, whether legal or equitable.1' 5 The court of appeals also limited
the application of the relation-back doctrine by holding that a successful
assertion of the innocent owner defense would not require the claimant
to have acquired an interest before the commission of the illicit acts. 16
The court reasoned that if it embraced the government's interpretation of
the relation-back doctrine" 7 the statutory, defense for innocent owners
109. Section I: A National Survey of Current Law - Summary and Analysis, 61
U.S.L.W. 1125 (1993) (discussing the federal circuit court split on how to reconcile this
conflict).
110. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
111. Id. at 1128.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1130-32.
114. Id. at 1131-34 (citing United States v. A Parcel of Land Known As 92 Buena Vista
Avenue, 937 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering the plain language of the statute in
determining the intended definition of the term "owner")).
115. Id. (citing United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 625 (3d Cir. 1989)
(considering the legislative history of the statute in holding that the term "owner" should
be broadly construed)).
116. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. at 1134-35.
117. The government contends that because of the operation of the relation-back doc-
trine, the claimant never actually had ownership of the property. Id. at 1134.
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would be effectively nullified. 118 The Supreme Court affirmed the hold-
ing of the court of appeals in a four-member plurality opinion.119
The government can no longer prematurely cut-off the innocent owner
defense by use of the relation-back doctrine. Moreover, any person with
a cognizable legal or equitable interest in property has standing to assert
this defense. 120
B. THE PROBLEM OF PROPORTIONALITY IN REM
1. The Disproportionate Results of Civil Forfeiture
In civil proceedings under section 881, the quantity and intended use of
any illegal contraband is not part of the judicial calculus for determining
the validity of the forfeiture. Nor does the value of the property forfeited
bear a direct relationship to the seriousness of the alleged activity which
gave rise to the forfeiture.' 2 ' Therefore, disproportionate consequences
are a common result with civil forfeiture proceedings. 122
This anomaly stems from the theory that an action in rem imposes no
"punishment" upon the owner. The Eighth Amendment was drafted to
act as a limitation upon the government's ability to fine and punish its
citizens, stipulating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' 23
Thus, the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive fines would not mitigate
the often harsh results of civil forfeiture proceedings under Section 881
unless those results constituted a "punishment" within the intended
meaning of the amendment.
2. The Supreme Court's Solution to the Problem of Proportionality In
Rem
In Austin v. United States,124 the claimant had been indicted on four
counts of state drug law violations. He pled guilty to one count of posses-
sion of narcotics with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment. The United States filed a subsequent action for the
forfeiture of the claimant's mobile home and his place of business. The
118. Id. at 1134-36 (noting that it was unlikely that Congress would enact a meaningless
statute).
119. Id. at 1138-46 (Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the conclu-
sion but faulted the plurality's reading of the statutory language; Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices Rehnquist and White, dissented, arguing that the claimant had no interest in the
property because of her donee status.).
120. Id. at 1134-35 (holding that the term "owner" is to include interests acquired by
gift and noting that it is clearly necessary for the government to successfully initiate legal
action before it can employ the relation-back doctrine).
121. Any "measurable quantity" of contraband is enough to support a civil forfeiture.
United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978).
122. See supra notes 8-11, 40-42 for examples of the disproportionate results of civil
forfeiture.
123. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII; Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,2803 n.2 (1993).
124. Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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district court granted summary judgment and the claimant argued in op-
position that the forfeiture was in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The initial inquiry is not, then, whether forfeiture of the claimant's
property under section 881 is civil or criminal in nature, it is whether or
not such a forfeiture constitutes a "punishment" triggering the applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 125 The Supreme Court examined the na-
ture of judicial sanctions and the possibility that they can be imposed to
carry out multiple purposes. 126 The common historical understanding of
civil forfeiture led the Court to conclude that forfeiture acts, at least in
part, as a punishment. The Court found nothing in the present statutory
language nor the legislative history of section 881 to contradict this con-
clusion.127 Therefore, the Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive fines
was held to apply, requiring that the results of a forfeiture pursuant to
section 881 must be proportionate to, inter alia, the seriousness of the
alleged activity and the extent of the claimant's involvement in that activ-
ity.' 28 The Court declined, however, to formulate a definitive test for
proportionality.' 29 This holding greatly limits the potency of civil forfei-
ture as a revenue engine for the government, but allows civil forfeiture to
retain the strength needed to deter and punish the drug traffickers origi-
nally targeted by the Drug Act. 130
C. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS AND CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
1. The Due Process Dilemma
Due process of law generally requires that the government not deprive
individuals of their life, liberty or property without first providing those
individuals adequate notice and an opportunity to have their position
heard.13' Exigent circumstances, constituting an exception to this general
rule, can arise when certain government interests are hindered by afford-
ing an individual pre-deprevation due process. 32 If the property in ques-
tion is of a readily moveable type, a car or boat for example, the
125. Id. at 2804-05 (noting that some provisions of the Bill of Rights are expressly re-
served for criminal defendants and that the Eighth Amendment includes no such limita-
tion; thus, it could be applied, under the proper circumstances, to proceedings that are not
criminal in nature).
126. Id. at 2806 (stating that sanctions can be both remedial and punitive in nature).
127. At the time of the amendment's drafting, the legal theories justifying civil forfei-
ture typically exhibited some notion of "punishment" as a central theme. Id. at 2806-11
(pointing out that section 881 is the only civil forfeiture statute to expressly provide a
defense based upon innocence, uniquely focusing on the culpability of the claimant; fur-
thermore, the provisions of the statute are intimately associated with the commission of
some criminal act, further evidencing the statute's punitive intent).
128. Id. at 2812 (noting that such factors may be relevant but that a comprehensive test
for proportionality is not to be limited to these factors alone).
129. Id. (stating that prudence dictated the deference of that question to the lower
courts in the first instance).
130. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
intent behind section 881.
131. U.S. CONST., amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without the due process of law.").
132. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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continuing jurisdiction of the court is in jeopardy. The property could be
moved and the court would lose in rem jurisdiction, thereby losing any
ability to enforce its laws concerning the property. 133 Therefore, because
continuing jurisdiction over the property is vital, continued control over
the property is of paramount concern to the government. In such cases,
requiring pre-deprivation due process seriously endangers the govern-
ment's ability to compel a justified forfeiture because it gives the property
owner the opportunity to remove the chattel from that jurisdiction.' 34 In
addition to continuing jurisdiction, other government interests at stake
include financial reliance on forfeiture as a means to fuel law enforce-
ment efforts and the minimalization of administrative burdens.135 The
potential frustration of these governmental interests must be weighed
against the claimant's right to exercise control over the property without
undue governmental interference and the right to be heard before the
government takes action.' 36
2. The Due Process Balancing Test Applied to Civil Forfeiture
In determining the due process to which the property owner is entitled,
the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge137 must be examined
in light of the nature of the property in question. This balancing of inter-
ests considers three issues: (1) the private interests affected by the gov-
ernment intrusion; (2) the risk of erroneous seizure; and (3) the
governmental interests at stake.' 38 In a civil forfeiture proceeding, both
notice of the seizure and an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure con-
stitute elements of due process. The government's interest must out-
weigh both these elements and the risk of an erroneous seizure for the
government to dispense with the requisite due process.' 39 The nature of
the seized property is a key factor in this analysis.
3. The Supreme Court's Analysis of the Counterbalance Between
Private and Governmental Interests
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 40 the Court ex-
amined the seizure of a parcel of real property used as the claimant's
residence. The claimant pleaded guilty to drug trafficking violations
under Hawaii state law, and, more than four years later, the federal gov-
ernment filed an in rem forfeiture action, claiming the residence was used
to facilitate the prior acts of the claimant. After the government obtained
a seizure warrant in an ex parte proceeding, the home was seized without
133. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht. Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
134. Id.
135. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
136. This balancing is part of the three-pronged test used to determine whether govern-
ment action violates due process. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
137. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
138. Id. at 335.
139. Id. at 333.
140. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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providing any prior notice or a hearing to the owner. The district court
upheld the seizure, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that a
seizure without prior notice and hearing represents a violation of due
process.14' The Supreme Court granted certiori and affirmed the court of
appeals holding regarding the due process question. 142
The Court examined the three prongs of the Mathews test143 in light of
the fact that the property seized was real property, which cannot be
moved. The government argued that the safeguards of compliance with
the Fourth Amendment were sufficient when seizing property prior to a
forfeiture and, in the alternative, that a seizure pursuant to drug forfei-
ture laws constitutes an exception to the due process requirement. 44 The
Court stated that although the Fourth Amendment does restrict the gov-
ernment's ability to seize property, it does not constitute the exclusive
determination of how the interests of a property owner are to be pro-
tected against government intrusion.145 The Court held that a seizure
that is intended to secure the government's interest in property and not
to preserve evidence of wrongdoing must not only comport with the
Fourth Amendment, but the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
as well. 46 Absent any extraordinary circumstances constituting an ex-
ception to the general due process requirements, the government is re-
quired to give a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing and adequate notice
to the owner, which in the present case it did not.
147
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,' 4s the Court held that
the government was justified in seizing a yacht prior to providing the
owner with notice and a hearing. 149 The Court based its decision on the
141. Id. at 495.
142. Id. (the Court reversed on the unrelated issue of non-compliance with certain tim-
ing requirements).
143. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
144. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 498-99 (the government immediately took pos-
session of the home and impounded the rental income from the property). The govern-
ment contended that its actions in this case satisfied the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and that such compliance should have been sufficient to cause the Court to
validate the forfeiture because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not
applicable and, in the alternative, that the Fifth Amendment imposed no additional re-
quirements on the government under the circumstances. PETITIONER'S BRIEF, 1992 WL
528507 at *9.
145. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 499.
146. Id. The threshold issue is not to determine which solitary amendment applies in
any given case, but rather whether the government intrusion has violated any of the consti-
tutional amendments. Contrary to what the government contends here, one amendment is
not applied at the exclusion of another. Id. at 499 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct.
538, 548 (U.S. 1992)). Exclusive reliance on the protections of the Fourth Amendment
may be appropriate in the criminal justice context because the amendment was "tailored
explicitly for the criminal justice system... [and its] balance between individual and public
interests always has been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of person
or property in criminal cases." Because the present case was a civil matter, exclusive reli-
ance on the protections of the Fourth would not be appropriate. Id. at 499-500 (citing
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
147. Id. at 498-501.
148. 461 U.S. 663 (1974).
149. Id. at 679.
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nature of the seized property and reasoned that a boat is the "sort [of
property] that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or
concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given."'150 The possi-
bility of frustrating the government's ability to assert in rem jurisdiction
by seizing the property creates a need for immediate action on the part of
the government, this prompt action comes in the form of seizure without
due process.
In James Daniel Good,'15 the Court held that due process must be af-
forded prior to the seizure of real property.' 52 The ownership of a home
is among the most important of any private interest in property, greater
than that of any personal property.' 53 When dealing with the ex parte
seizure of a home, careful attention must be given to the protection of the
owner because of the importance of the interests involved and the unilat-
eral nature of the proceeding. The ex parte proceeding does not require
the government to answer any possible claims of the owner. Instead, the
government must only demonstrate to the magistrate judge that there is
probable cause to believe a nexus exists between the property and a drug
violation. 154 Thus, the ex parte proceeding gives no protection to the in-
nocent owner, making this an unacceptable risk of erroneous
deprivation. 155
For jurisdiction to attach in an in rem forfeiture, there must be a physi-
cal seizure of the property. Real property, however, is governed by the
law of the situs and no physical seizure is required for judicial cognizance
to attach.' 56 Therefore, continuing jurisdiction is not reliant upon a phys-
ical seizure of the property and can be maintained without permitting the
government to bypass the requisite due process. The government's inter-
est in continued in rem jurisdiction is outweighed by the private interest
at stake in home ownership and the risk of erroneous deprivation of
rights - due process must be afforded the claimant in such cases. The
Court also rejected the government's claim that the property is in danger
150. Id.
151. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
152. Id. at 500-05
153. Id. at 501.
154. United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. $364,960 in U.S. Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
155. James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. at 501-02 (noting that because the government
stands to benefit financially from the seizure, "it makes sense to scrutinize governmental
action more closely." The Court called for an element of neutrality in governmental deci-
sion making, regardless of its form) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2682, 2693 n.9
(1991)).
156. Id. at 502-03. Section 881 anticipates that process would be executed on real prop-
erty without a physical seizure:
[i]f the character or situation of the property is such that the taking actual
possession is impracticable, the marshal or other person executing the pro-
cess shall affix a copy thereof to the property in a conspicuous place and
leave a copy of the complaint and process with the person having possession
or the person's agent.




of being destroyed, sold or used to facilitate additional illegal activity if
due process is provided. 157 The government then points to the prior con-
viction of the property owner as justification for the lack of due process,
claiming that the government's knowledge of the conviction at the time of
the seizure pardons their non-compliance. 158 The guilt or innocence of
the claimant, however, does not determine the procedures required of the
government. The question is the legality of the seizure, not the potential
success of the government's case. 159
The designation of section 881 as a civil proceeding has led to these
harsh and unfair results. The procedural aspects of civil forfeiture stack
the deck heavily in favor of the government and place an unfair burden
upon the property owner who has the option of fighting the almost unlim-
ited legal and financial resources of the government or allowing the for-
feiture to summarily occur. Once the property has been forfeited,
however, the injustice does not end. The vaguely drafted provisions of
the Drug Act and the lack of administrative safeguards encourage the
abuse of forfeited property by law enforcement officials.
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC ADMINISTRATION OF 21 U.S.C. § 881
The administration of section 881 by law enforcement officials creates a
potential for abuse including the misuse of forfeited property and the cor-
ruption that comes with a financial incentive system.
A. ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES CREATE A POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
AND MISMANAGEMENT
The National Assets Seizure and Forfeiture Fund16° was created in
1985 by the Department of Justice as a holding bay for drug-related for-
feitures. At its inception, the Fund had an inventory of $27 million in
seized property. 161 Each year the inventory in the Fund grows by almost
$500 million, and over $1.4 billion in property presently awaits forfei-
157. 114 S. Ct. at 503-07. The court noted several possible means for protecting gov-
ernmental interests in property without a physical seizure: the sale of the property can be
prevented by filing a notice of lis pendens; the government can obtain an ex parte re-
straining order to protect against the possibility of waste or destruction, but the govern-
ment's practice of trading non-disturbance for attomment with tenants under an existing
occupancy agreement indicates that there is little danger of waste in the ordinary case; and
by obtaining search and arrest warrants as the need arises, the government can pre-empt
the use of the property in any subsequent illicit activity. Id. Under the circumstances, the
Court determined that the government's interests are in no way hindered by requiring due
process of law. Id. at 507.
158. Id. at 505 (this argument was rejected because the Court considered that the valid-
ity of this seizure would depend upon compliance with due process and not the strength of
any prior criminal conviction of the claimant).
159. Id. (the holding is not limited to residential real property, but is applicable to all
real property).
160. Hereinafter "Fund."
161.. Sean P. Murphy, Forfeitures Help Finance the War on Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
10, 1991, at 17.
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ture.162 Despite this amazing growth, the number of Federal Marshals
charged with accounting for the inventory had not increased during the
first five years since the creation of the Fund. 163 The marshals must keep
tabs on an inventory of over 300,000 items located in over ninety-four
districts nationwide. 164
These accounting procedures leave much to be desired in the way of
inventory security. The government's General Accounting Office 165 has
labeled civil forfeiture as a "high risk" government program. 166 The Jus-
tice Department's Inspector General characterizes the accounting and
management procedures as "poor inventory control," and stated to Con-
gress that in an audit of one district office, "over one-third of the jewelry
we attempted to trace from the reports could not be located in storage,
and over one-half the automobiles could not be located based upon the
computerized records."'1 67
These inadequate accounting procedures invite the abuse of asset in-
ventories. Serious questions arise as to the use and sale of forfeited prop-
erty and the financial incentives for law enforcement officials created by a
profit-sharing system.
B. THE USE OF FORFEITED ASSETS
The government utilizes forfeited assets as part of a financial incentive
system. Government officials encourage and reward airline and hotel
employees to report travelers who exhibit "suspicious" behavior. 168 Any
proceeds from civil forfeiture can also be distributed to or split with any
government agency who directly participated in the seizure or forfeiture
of the property.169
The normal working relationship between law enforcement agencies
can be distorted by this financial incentive system.170 Local law enforce-
162. Sean P. Murphy, 10 Sites.Are Seized in U.S. Drug Sweep, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8,
1991, at 17; Use Drug Profits to Treat Addicts, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1991, at 37.
163. In 1985, there were 240 full-time marshals in charge of accounting for the inven-
tory, and in 1990 the number of marshals remained the same. Tom Watson, Marshals
Struggle to Keep Tabs on Forfeited Goods, AM. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at 4.
164. Id.
165. Hereinafter "GAO".
166. Watson, supra note 163, at 4. The GAO cites past mismanagement of Fund inven-
tories and the selling of property at far below fair market value in its evaluation. The GAO
considers the program a financial liability for the government. Id.
167. Id.
168. Jones v. United States D.E.A., 819 F. Supp. 698, 724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
169. 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1988).
170. The government's financial interest in the pursuance of forfeiture is embodied in a
1990 memo from the Attorney General of the United States:
w]e must significantly increase production to reach our budget target ...
[failure to achieve the $470 million projection would expose the Depart-
ment's forfeiture program to criticism and undermine confidence in our
budget projections. Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income
during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990.
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 38 U.S. ATTORNEY'S
BULLETIN 180, 182 (1990).
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ment officials may seek out and encourage federal assistance when it is
not appropriate to do so if their state does not permit civil forfeiture;
similarly, local law enforcement officials may attempt to avoid sharing the
spoils of forfeiture by discouraging the needed participation by federal
officials in states with very broad civil forfeiture powers.' 71 This system
gives law enforcement officials a direct financial interest in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of illicit behavior. 172 Both American and English
legal history demonstrate the dangerous consequences of such a financial
incentive system; the salaries of magistrates, judges, and sheriffs once
having been based on such incentives is "an unsavory and embarrassing
scar on the administration of justice."'1 73
Law enforcement officials often make personal use of the forfeited
property. 174 Forfeited assets and proceeds are not included in the budg-
ets of law enforcement agencies, meaning that there is no requirement to
account to an outside agency for its receipt or manner of use.' 75 Law
enforcement officials are only required to sign a form vaguely promising
that the property will be utilized for "law enforcement purposes.' 76
Forfeited assets are often sold at public auctions177 at far below their
fair market value. 178 The sheer size of the Fund's inventory makes it un-
manageable and the government must often wait out lengthy judicial ap-
peals before the property can be offered for sale. Thus, property can
linger in government warehouses for long periods of time, either losing its
value altogether or being greatly depreciated. Because property held by
the government for such lengthy periods would inevitably require exten-
171. David A. Kaplan, Where the Innocent Lose, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 42. Local
law enforcement agencies armed with potent forfeiture statutes can reap huge benefits.
For example, a Kansas City suburb of 29,000 residents presently awaits the forfeiture of
over $250,000 in cash and property. 137 CONG. REC. E3059 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Jacobs).
172. Financial incentives can produce counter-intuitive behavior in law enforcement of-
ficials. For example, Florida drug agents allegedly make greater attempts to stop drug
buyers who are on their way south into the state while they still have forfeitable cash; drug
couriers moving along the northern route out of the state have already purchased their
drugs, which are seizable but of no benefit to the police, and are allegedly subject to less
intensive surveillance efforts. Kaplan, supra note 171, at 42.
173. Jones v. United States D.E.A., 819 F. Supp. 698, 724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
174. A chief assistant prosecutor in New Jersey uses a seized yellow Corvette as his
personal vehicle. 137 CONG. REC. E3059 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Jacobs). A New York District Attorney, who was recently called before the County Legis-
lature to explain the informal use of seized property, drives to work in a seized BMW. Cris
Carmody, Forfeiture Laws Get a Second Look, THE NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 7. Denver
police appropriated the weight-lifting equipment from a health club drug raid. Kaplan,
supra note 171, at 42.
175. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 724.
176. 137 CONG. REC. E3059 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Rep. Jacobs).
177. The Drug Act permits the disposal of property by "any other commercially feasi-
ble means." 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(B) (1988).
178. Tom Watson, Marshal's Struggle to Keep Tabs on Forfeited Goods, AM. LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at 4. In one case, a fishing trawler valued at over $50,000 was sold
for $10 at a public auction to a lone bidder. Id. at 4. In another, two parcels of land valued
at almost $200,000 were sold to personal friends of the county prosecutor for only $20,000.




sive repair and management expenditures, the Fund's inventory may not
only depreciate in value but may actually become a financial liability.179
Furthermore, property which is seized and held by the government is tax
exempt, adding another dimension to this financial burden. 180 In Dade
County, Florida, the Federal government holds title to over 600 forfeited
local properties valued at over $159 million. This translates into a $3.72
million annual loss in tax revenues for the county.181
The administration of civil forfeitures under section 881 by law en-
forcement officials creates a financial incentive system with a high poten-
tial for abuse. Misuse and mismanagement of asset inventories should
trigger heightened suspicion and scrutiny of the methods employed and
the intent behind the stepped-up use of the government's forfeiture
power.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, periods of war typically coincide with periods of strong
economic growth and prosperity.' 8 2 The recent "war" on drugs has fol-
lowed this trend - it has padded the coffers of the state and greatly ex-
panded its powers, but at the cost of restricting the liberties protected by
the Constitution. This has led to re-examination of the powers created by
modem drug laws. Today, courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to
preventing unjust and unfair consequences under civil forfeiture
proceedings.' 8 3
It is important to consider, however, that while protecting the rights of
property owners, the steps to limit government power should not go so
far as to create a safe harbor for drug traffickers. The broadening of the
"innocent owner" defense creates attractive money laundering opportu-
nities for drug traffickers.'8 The broad power of the government needs
to be held in check, but not in such a way as to restrain the. Drug Act
from achieving its original purpose.'8 5
Critics of civil forfeiture call for many changes to be made. Some
members of Congress are advocating such changes as an increased bur-
den of proof for the government, the elimination of the cost-bond system
which puts a premium on the right to contest a forfeiture, and govern-
179. Watson, supra note 178, at 4.
180. Rick Eyerdam, Dade Drowning in Properties Seized From Crime, S. FLA. Bus. J.,
July 27, 1992, at 1A.
181. Id. An assistant Dade County Attorney has filed over 122 suits against the U.S.
Government for the payment of these taxes. Id.
182. RANDOLPH BOURNE, WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS, 65-71 (1964) (the prosperity
which war often heralds explains why wars are typically popular with state leaders despite
their destructive capacity).
183. See, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993); Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
184. Robert G. Morvillo, Forfeiture: Procedures, Interpretations, Defense, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 3, 1993, at 3 (discussing the possibility of creating money laundering situations).
185. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the original intent
of the Drug Act.
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mental liability for property damage occurring while the property is in the
government's possession. 186 Some critics, who are more concerned with
stemming the demand for drugs as opposed to the supply, are calling for a
re-directing of forfeited assets into community-based drug abuse preven-
tion and education programs. 187 Almost half of American states impose
a tax on the possession and distribution of illegal drugs as an additional
legal weapon. 88
Future judicial remedies could include a more strict "substantial con-
nection test," which would deny forfeiture if the government fails to show
the nexus between the property and the illicit behavior under a height-
ened standard of proof. The use of a more strict substantial connection
test would help to mitigate the harsh results of many civil forfeiture
cases.' 89 Considering that the United States maintains what is possibly
the largest numbers of police and military personnel forces in the world,
if it were possible to strong-arm a way out of the drug crisis, these efforts
would surely have been effective by now.
In conclusion, the government has pursued the use of civil forfeiture
almost without regard to the property rights of its citizens. The proce-
dural advantages enjoyed by the government are based solely upon the
legal fiction that an in rem proceeding does not affect the rights of the
property owner - a legal theory that uses the personification of objects
as its historical foundation. The respective burdens of proof weigh heav-
ily in favor of the government and place an unfair burden upon the prop-
erty owner. Under these circumstances, the individual property owner
186. Holly R. Skolnick & G. Richard Straffer, Restrictions for Asset Forfeitures, LEGAL
TIMES, July 26, 1993, at S34 (anticipating possible Congressional restructuring of current
drug laws).
187. See, e.g., PR Newswire Association, Inc., U.S. First - Federal Forfeited properties
Transferred to Community Groups for Weed and Seed, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 26, 1992; Mar-
cia Coyle, Forfeiture Frenzy, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 5, 1993, at 11. These critics often cite the
"push-down/pop-up" theory as an argument against policing the flow of drugs and replac-
ing such efforts with programs to educate about drug use. Ethan Nedelman, The Case for
Legalization, 92 PUB. INTEREST 3, 9 (1988) (theorizing that if drug production is eliminated
or substantially curbed in one foreign country, another source country will simply rise to
take its place-making the supply of illegal drugs inexhaustible; for example, Colombian
drug production grew rapidly as Mexico successfully curbed its drug production in the
early 1970s, but presently, Mexican drug production is experiencing rapid growth as Co-
lombia slowly begins to eradicate its drug trafficking industry).
188. Twenty-one states have imposed taxes on dealings with illegal narcotics. The states
actually anticipate the non-payment of the tax, allowing a fine to be imposed based on the
non-payment. These fines are potentially much greater than typical criminal narcotics
fines and avoid the constitutional issues of property forfeiture. The fines can be imposed
and collected immediately upon arrest and can be kept by the state without violating any-
one's constitutional rights even absent a successful criminal drug conviction. Robert E.
Tomasson, 21 States Imposing Drug Tax and Then Fining the Evaders, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1990, at 1.
189. See, e.g., United States v. 3639-2d St. N.E., 869 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1989)
(using a more stringent substantial connection test to limit the forfeiture power of the
government); United States v. Various Parcels of Real Property, 650 F. Supp. 62, 65 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) (requiring the government to substantiate specific facts to create a substantial
connection); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying a
more strict substantial connection test).
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has the choice of fighting the almost unlimited resources of the govern-
ment or allowing the forfeiture to occur without contest. Furthermore, if
the claimant does prevail at trial, the statute provides no adequate rem-
edy for the temporary deprivation of property erroneously suffered.
However, once the property has been forfeited, the injustice turns to po-
tential corruption. The vague provisions of the Drug Act and the lack of
administrative safeguards encourage the abuse of forfeited property by
law enforcement officials. The present management of property forfeited
to the government creates a financial incentive system which distorts the
normally legitimate motives behind the prosecution of illegal activity.
The scope of the government's forfeiture power must be curtailed in such
a manner as to alleviate these problems but to allow the Drug Act to
continue as an effective tool in the war on drugs.
